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This paper employs ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation to examine the determinants of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the effect of FDI on per capita GDP growth in Bolivia over the period 1990:1-1998:4.  The 
regression results find that the real effective multilateral exchange rate, the ratio of external debt to GDP, and a 
dummy representing capitalization inflows significantly impact FDI, while FDI, along with the terms-of-trade, the 
ratio of private sector credit to GDP, and the ratio of government spending to GDP are shown to have a statistically 
significant impact on per capita GDP growth.  The exclusion of capitalization inflows from total FDI in the FDI 
determinants model has very little impact on the overall results. 
 
Additional sections of the paper examine FDI in historical context and the composition of FDI by breaking down 
FDI flows by sector and country of origin.  Historically, FDI inflows have been concentrated in the hydrocarbon 
and mining sectors.  However, inflows to these and other sectors were low when compared to other countries in the 
region, likely in response to political and economic stability.  In recent years FDI in the mining sector has declined, 
while FDI in the hydrocarbon and service sectors has surged to unprecedented levels.  These two sectors received 
80.4 percent of all FDI over the period 1990-98.  Finally, the United States continues to be the principal source of 
FDI in Bolivia.  Over the 1990-98 period FDI originating in the United States represented 40.7 percent of all FDI in 
Bolivia.  Other important sources of FDI in the 1990s have been the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, 
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1.  Introduction 
Bolivia, like many other developing countries, has experienced a sharp increase in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the 1990s.  The driving forces behind the surge in FDI inflows have been the deep structural reforms 
adopted under the government of Dr. Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1985-89), the implementation of a broad set of 
economic reforms in the early to mid-1990s, and, most importantly, the capitalization of the principal state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) carried out under the government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-97).  By the early 1990s 
the deep and sustained reforms had begun to yield modest inflows of FDI, while the capitalization process in the 
second half of the 1990s has caused FDI to surge to record levels.  In 1998 FDI reached the unprecedented level of 
$872 million in nominal terms and continues to be the principal source of capital flows to Bolivia due to the virtual 
nonexistence of portfolio investment in Bolivia’s underdeveloped capital markets (Figure 1).   
 




















Sources:  Central Bank of Bolivia, External Sector Bulletin, various issues.
 
 
The dramatic increase in FDI in recent years has raised a number of important questions, two of which we will 
examine in detail in this paper. First, what are the primary factors responsible for the upsurge in FDI in recent 
years?  And, second, what has been the effect of the increase in FDI on economic growth in Bolivia?  These two 
questions are tackled using a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure.  In the case of the first question   -3-    
regressions are re-estimated excluding capitalization inflows from the FDI total.  This specification will provide a 
clearer examination of FDI determinants in a more traditional FDI setting void of capitalization inflows.  Additional 
sections of the paper will look at FDI inflows from a historical perspective and examine the composition of FDI 
flows by sector and country of origin. 
 
Foreign investment plays a crucial role in developing countries like Bolivia for a number of reasons.  Most 
importantly, FDI has been shown to positively impact economic growth by increasing total investment (Table 1) and 
improving productivity in the host economy through the diffusion of advanced technology and management skills.  
In one study examining a cross-section of twelve Latin American countries for the period 1950-85, FDI was shown 
to be a significant determinant of economic growth and was estimated to be three to six times more efficient than 
domestic investment (De Gregorio, 1992).  Further evidence presented in a recent study by Borensztein et al. (1998) 
of a sample of 69 developing countries over the period 1970-1989 finds that FDI produces a crowding-in effect, 
with each additional dollar of FDI generating between $1.5 and $2.8 in total investment.  However, the authors 
conclude that FDI will only positively impact economic growth when the stock of human capital in the host country 
meets a minimum threshold which allows it to efficiently absorb and utilize the inflows of modern technology.  
Lastly, a strong case can be made that FDI is more productive than domestic investment, as any firm entering a 
domestic market must somehow compensate for the inherent advantages enjoyed by the domestic firm by 
possessing compensating advantages such as superior technology or products, or firm-level economies of scale. 
 








% of Total 
Investment Total
% of Total 
Investment Total
% of Total 
Investment Total % of GDP
1990 67.0 0.10 294.6 0.44 315.4 0.47 677.0 0.14
1991 95.7 0.10 410.8 0.44 420.5 0.45 927.0 0.17
1992 122.1 0.11 410.0 0.39 531.6 0.50 1063.6 0.19
1993 123.6 0.12 468.2 0.44 480.6 0.45 1072.3 0.19
1994 130.2 0.13 345.4 0.35 513.3 0.52 988.8 0.17
1995 374.3 0.27 502.7 0.36 519.7 0.37 1396.7 0.21
1996 474.1 0.28 607.5 0.36 588.7 0.35 1670.3 0.23
1997 730.5 0.32 997.1 0.44 548.3 0.24 2275.9 0.29
1998 (p) 872.0 0.33 1235.6 0.47 502.9 0.19 2610.5 0.30
Notes: (p) prelimary.  Due to rounding components of total investment may not add up to 100 percent.
Sources: Central Bank of Bolivia; IMF, International Financial Statistics CD ROM (January 1999); and UDAPE, Dossier of Social and
Economic Statistics for Bolivia, 1998.
 
 
Among the possible adverse effects associated with FDI is the potential volatility of these flows in the long run.  
Although long-term capital inflows (cold money) are generally believed to be less volatile than short-term capital 
inflows (hot money), a recent study by Claessens et al. (1995) of five industrial countries and five developing 
countries finds evidence suggesting that long-term capital flows are often just as volatile as short-term capital flows, 
and highlights the difficulties in distinguishing between FDI and other long-term flows.  Additionally, distortionary   -4-    
trade or tax regimes may inhibit the ability of FDI to act as a positive means of advanced technology transfer.  For 
instance, protectionist trade policies may lead to tariff hopping, in which would be exporters are inclined to enter 
the host countries domestic market by way of FDI.  Similarly, tax or other incentives presented to foreign investors 
with the aim of developing a strategic industrial sector in the host country may encourage FDI to enter industries in 
which it lacks a competitive advantage in the domestic or global market.  Under these scenarios, the response of 
FDI flows to a distorted set of economic incentives may lead to a misallocation of resources, undermine the ability 
of FDI to act as a channel for the transfer of modern technology, and produce lower levels of productivity in the 
host economy.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 gives a brief historical overview of FDI; Section 3 
examines the composition of recent FDI flows; Section 4 offers a brief analysis of the data used in our empirical 
investigation; Sections 5 and 6 present our models and empirical results for the determinates of FDI and the effect 
of FDI on per capita GDP growth, respectively; Section 7 discusses the specification tests carried out on our 
models; and Section 8 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Historical Overview of Foreign Direct Investment in Bolivia 
2.1.  Direct Investment following the 1952 Revolution   
     As Table 2 indicates, the first measurements of FDI in Bolivia are available from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) beginning in 1955, and from 1960 forward on an annual basis.  Direct investment flows to Bolivia from 
1960 to roughly the early 1990s were minimal when compared to other countries in Latin America due in large part 
to the political and economic instability that Bolivia experienced during this period.  A brief comparison with two of 
its Andean neighbors (themselves not immune to instability) demonstrates the virtually negligible role of FDI in 
Bolivia during this period.  Between 1960 and 1990 FDI averaged $7.6 per capita annually in Ecuador, $3.4 per 
capita in Peru, and only $2 per capita in Bolivia.  While Ecuador and Peru all saw substantial increases in FDI in the 
1970s, FDI in Bolivia shrank by more than 50 percent from an average of $7.6 million a year in the 1960s to $3.7 
million a year in the 1970s.  Meanwhile, FDI in Ecuador increased nearly fivefold from an average of $14.1 million 
per year in the 1960s to $68.3 million in the 1970s while Peru saw FDI increase more than 800 percent from $8.2 
million to $66 million over the same period.  
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Table 2.  Foreign Direct Investment in Bolivia, 1955-89 (In millions of U.S. dollars)
Year Total Year Total
1955                                                                   2.6  1975                                                                53.4 
1960                                                                 16.5  1976 -8.1 
1961                                                                 11.4  1977 -1.2 
1962                                                                 10.1  1978                                                                11.5 
1963                                                                   5.8  1979                                                                35.0 
1964                                                                   1.5  1980                                                                47.0 
1965                                                                 12.5  1981                                                                75.7 
1966                                                                   2.0  1982                                                                31.1 
1967                                                                   0.5  1983                                                                  7.0 
1968                                                                   6.5  1984                                                                  7.0 
1969                                                                   9.1  1985                                                                10.0 
1970  -75.9  1986                                                                10.0 
1971                                                                   1.9  1987                                                                38.1 
1972  -10.5  1988 -10.1
1973                                                                   4.6  1989 -24.4
1974                                                                 25.9 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics , various issues.  
 
The small amounts of FDI that did enter Bolivia in the 1960s and 1970s resulted primarily from American 
investment and were concentrated in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors.  Following the Revolution of 9 April 
1952 the government of Paz Estenssoro allowed foreign capital to enter Bolivia, and in 1953 made favorable 
changes to the petroleum sector legislation.  By the end of the decade these changes had lured ten United States 
petroleum companies to Bolivia.  The majority of investments made following these changes occurred after the 
arrival in 1955 of the Bolivian Gulf Oil Corporation, which began the construction of a gas pipeline to Argentina 
and invested substantial sums in a large natural gas deposit discovered in the mid-1960s.  Meanwhile, though the 
government nationalized the three largest mining interests following the Revolution, the government never 
threatened to nationalize the mining interests owned by American company W. Grace Co., allowing inflows of 
foreign capital to continue unabated (Morales and Sachs, 1990).   
 
In 1965 the government of President René Barrientos deepened the economic reforms begun under Paz 
Estenssoro by liberalizing the investment code for foreign capital.  This change allowed United States Steel to rent 
the Matilde zinc mine from COMIBOL (the state mining corporation), producing an influx of foreign capital which 
helped COMIBOL achieve its first profits in 1966.  Meanwhile the Bolivian Gulf Oil Corporation was given further 
concessions so that it could complete its oil pipeline from Tarija and Santa Cruz to the Pacific coast via the 
altiplano. 
 
The generally supportive atmosphere foreign investors received following the 1952 Revolution came to an 
abrupt end in September 1969 when Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas was overthrown in a coup d’état led by General 
Alfredo Ovando Candia.  In a populist prescription designed to win political favor, Ovando nationalized the 
Bolivian Gulf Oil Corporation in October 1969.  As shown in Table 2, this move had a profound impact on FDI, as   -6-    
foreign investors pulled $75.9 million out of Bolivia in 1970, producing the biggest yearly outflow of FDI ever 
recorded in Bolivia (Morales and Sachs, 1990). 
 
In 1970 Ovando was deposed in a coup d’état led by General Juan José Torres (1970-71).  The slowly 
improving economic and social conditions gave the populist military regime of Torres the confidence to deepen the 
anti-foreign capitalist policies adopted under Ovando by radically altering a number of favorable foreign investment 
policies adopted between previous Bolivian governments and the United States.  Torres not only annulled a special 
contract signed between COMIBOL and a United States mining company to extract tin from the Catavi tin mine 
tailings, but then went a step further and forced U.S. Steel to relinquish its contractual rights to run the Matilde zinc 
mine.  
 
In August 1971 Torres was overthrown in a coup d’état led by the military party Bolivian Socialist Phalange 
(FSB) and the MNR, and Coronel Hugo Banzer assumed power. The government of Banzer further liberalized the 
investment code, moved to improve the poor relations with the United States that had developed under Torres, and 
devalued the exchange rate in 1972, a decision that encouraged comparatively large capital inflows of FDI in the 
mid-1970s (Table 2).     
 
The 40 percent devaluation of the peso in late 1972 was caused in large part by the nationalization of the 
Bolivian Gulf Oil Corporation’s assets in 1969, a move that provoked upward pressures on the peso.
1  T h i s  
overvaluation hurt the mining sector, which suffered not only from Banzer’s incentive-based focus on the 
hydrocarbon, agro-industry, and service sectors located around Santa Cruz in the eastern lowlands, but also from 
both taxation and the exchange rate misalignment.  Consequently many of its resources were shifted to the non-
tradable manufacturing and service sectors.  Although the hydrocarbon sector experienced a contraction in export 
earnings during the period of overvaluation (1969-72), its export earnings were still relatively high during the 
Banzer years due to two important factors.  First, the overvaluation of the peso led to an increase in capital intensive 
activities associated with the hydrocarbon sector such as oil refining, and secondly, the OPEC oil embargo in the 
mid-1970s produced a fourfold increase in international oil prices. 
 
The period immediately following the military regime of Banzer provides an interesting paradox with respect to 
foreign investment.  From 1978 to 1982 Bolivia had eight military governments and three civilian governments, yet 
the levels of FDI achieved during this period were among the highest ever recorded in Bolivia until the mid-1990s.  
These high levels were due in particular to strong inflows into the mining and hydrocarbon sectors.  Increased 
investment in the mining sector resulted from the 1979 easing of two restrictive taxes which had discouraged 
foreign investment.  The first such tax was the regalía tax which was adopted in 1965 and imposed a tax on 
presumed income, while the second was an export tax adopted immediately following the devaluation in 1972 
(Morales and Sachs, 1990).  These two measures helped to counteract Resolution 24 of the Cartagena Accord 
adopted by members of the Andean Pact in the early 1970s which restricted the rights of foreign investors to invest 
                                                           
1 In spite of the devaluation in 1972, Bolivia still maintained a persistently overvalued exchange rate throughout the 1970s.   -7-    
in manufacturing firms and to remit profits to their home countries. Meanwhile, the hydrocarbon sector continued to 
benefit greatly from increased FDI following the oil boom in the mid-1970s, and the opening of the natural gas 
pipeline to Argentina in 1972. 
 
The strong FDI flows experienced during the better part of the Banzer regime, and into the early 1980s, would 
eventually decline as foreign investors realized that the average real GDP growth of 5.4 percent achieved during the 
Banzer years masked mounting external debts, and an overvalued exchange rate, among other economic 
weaknesses.  These weaknesses worsened markedly as a result of the political chaos that reigned following the 
Banzer presidency and would eventually provide the basis for the deep economic crisis Bolivia confronted in the 
mid-1980s.   
 
By the end of 1983 inflation had soared to 275.6 percent annually and the combination of increasingly high 
international interest rates and a sharp drop in commodity prices led to a 6.55 percent contraction in real GDP 
(Morales and Sachs, 1990).  By the second quarter of 1984 the large fiscal deficit, lack of access to foreign 
borrowing (which had dried up in 1982) needed to finance government expenditures, the inability to reform the tax 
system, political instability, the rapid expansion of the money supply, and a number of other factors combined to 
trigger a hyperinflationary period which would last until September 1985.  In the context of hyperinflation, which 
averaged 20,000 percent between August 1984 and August 1985, and reached an annualized rate of 60,000 percent 
between May 1985 and August 1985, Bolivia witnessed a substantial contraction in FDI flows (Sachs, 1987). 
 
Unable to halt inflation, President Hernán Siles Suazo was replaced in early elections by former president 
Víctor Paz Estenssoro.  On 29 August 1985 the new government of Paz Estenssoro implemented the NEP, a 
stabilization program that ended the hyperinflation within days of its implementation.  However, the stabilization 
program and other economic reforms failed to jump-start FDI, which recorded negative levels in 1988 and 1989 
(Table 2).  It was only in the early 1990s that FDI began to increase significantly due to the adoption of a set of 
second generation reforms which included the deepening of the original NEP reforms under the government of 
Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-93) and the adoption of the Plan de Todos (Plan for All), whose centerpiece was 
capitalization, under the presidency of Sánchez de Lozada.
2 
 
2.2.  The Capitalization Period 
On 21 March 1994 the Bolivian Congress adopted the Capitalization Law laid out by the government of 
President Sánchez de Lozada with the stated objective of transferring the six principal SOEs in Bolivia from state 
control into private hands.  These six companies⎯YPFB (oil and gas), ENDE (electricity), ENFE (railways), 
ENTEL (telecommunications), LAB (aviation), and EMV (mining and smelting)⎯represented roughly 12.5 percent 
                                                           
2 The most important of these second generation reforms are the Investment Law (17 September 1990), Privatization Law (24 
April 1992), Capitalization Law (21 March 1994), Popular Participation Law (20 April 1994), the Sectoral Regulation Law (28 
October 1994), Electricity Law (21 December 1994), Telecommunications Law (5 July 1995), Hydrocarbon Law (30 April 
1996), Pensions Law (29 November 1996), Mining Code (17 March 1997), Stock Market Law (31 March 1998), Property and 
Popular Credit Law (15 June 1998), and the Securities Law (25 June 1998).   -8-    
of GDP.  Their capitalization was undertaken with the primary objective of increasing savings and investment in 
Bolivia, as well as investment in human capital, in order to generate higher growth rates and reduce poverty 
(Graham, 1997).  In order to achieve these objectives the government adopted a modified version of more 
traditional privatization schemes which it dubbed capitalization.  Under the capitalization scheme the six SOEs were 
put up for sale by international tender and the winning bidder gained management control and a 50 percent equity 
stake in the capitalized enterprise.  In contrast to traditional privatization schemes where the winning tender is paid 
to the government, the capitalization program required the successful bidder to invest the money in the company 
itself over a stated time period, effectively doubling its net worth.  The remaining 50 percent of the shares were 
divided equally among all adult Bolivians and deposited with one of two new private pension fund managers.   
 
Table 3.  Foreign Direct Investment Commitments Resulting from Capitalization
Sector/Firm Foreign Investor Date of Purchase Purchase Price
Electricity
     Corani Dominion Energy (USA) June 29, 1995 $58,796,300
     Guaracachi Energy Initiatives (USA) June 29, 1995 $47,131,000
     Valle Hermoso Constellation Energy (USA) June 29, 1995 $33,921,100
Telecommunications
     ENTEL STET International (Italy) September 28, 1995 $610,000,000
Aviation
     LAB VASP (Brazil) October 19, 1995 $47,470,000
Railways
     Andean Rail Network Cruz Blanca (Chile) December 15, 1995 $13,251,000
     Eastern Rail Network Cruz Blanca (Chile) December 15, 1995 $25,853,099
Hydrocarbons
     Empresa Petrolera Andina YPF and Pérez Companc (Argentina), Pluspetrol Bolivia (Spain) December 5, 1996 $264,777,021
     Empresa Petrolera Chaco Amoco Bolivia Petroleum Company (USA) December 5, 1996 $306,667,001
     Transportadora Boliviana  Enron Transportadora (USA), Shell Overseas Holding Ltd. December 5, 1996 $263,500,000
          de Hidrocarburos      (Britain/Netherlands)
Total $1,671,366,521
Sources: Ministry of Capitalization, Capitalization: The Bolivian Model of Economic and Social Reform, 1996; and The Economist (1997, p. 30).  
 
The FDI commitments resulting from the capitalization process are presented in Table 3.  As Table 3 shows the 
capitalization process has produced investment commitments of nearly $1.7 billion.
3  The resulting inflows have 
caused FDI to surge from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1990 to 10.2 percent in 1998, making Bolivia the largest recipient 
in percentage terms of FDI in Latin America (Table 4).  During the period 1995:2-1998:4 inflows from 
capitalization represented 42.8 percent of all FDI, and preliminary estimates indicate that capitalization flows will 
surge to 55.7 percent of all FDI flows in 1999.
4  These capitalization inflows have helped to finance a sharp increase 
                                                           
3 The tin and antimony smelter, EMV, originally scheduled to be divested under the capitalization program, was privatized in 
December 1999.  Due to strong opposition by miners at the Huanuni and Colquiri mines, the capitalization, and later 
privatization of Vinto, as EMV is commonly known, had been delayed on a number of occasions.  Meanwhile, the privatization 
of the refinery unit of the state oil and gas company YPFB was completed in mid-November 1999. 
4 A number of Bolivian companies were also privatized in the early to mid-1990s, but the resulting FDI inflows were minimal 
when compared to those of capitalization.  In the first round of privatization over the 1992-93 period, 24 companies were 
privatized raising approximately $18.7 million from solely domestic investors (Requena, 1996).  The second round of 
privatization was carried out over the 1995-96 period and produced the sale of 49 of the 72 companies scheduled for 
privatization, raising nearly $97.5 million, of which $58.3 million came in the form of FDI.  The foreign investors were EMEL 
of Chile which purchased the Cochabamba Light and Electricity Company (ELFEC) for $50.3 million, and the Gloria Group of 
Peru which purchased the industrial milk plants (PIL) in La Paz and Cochabamba for $1.8 and $6.2 million, respectively.    -9-    
in the current account deficit.  From 1990 to 1994 the current account deficit represented on average 3.5 percent of 
GDP.  However, since 1995 the trade deficit has widened every year, reaching 7.9 percent of GDP in 1998. 
 
Table 4.  Primary Recipients of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America, 1990-98
(In percent of GDP)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Argentina 1.3 1.3 1.8 1.0 1.1 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.1
Bolivia 0.6 1.0 1.6 2.2 2.2 5.6 6.4 9.2 10.2
Brazil 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.7 1.4 2.4 4.1
Chile 1.9 2.4 2.2 2.3 5.1 4.6 6.8 7.0 6.4
Colombia 1.2 1.1 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.8 5.9 3.0
Ecuador 1.2 1.4 1.4 3.3 3.2 2.6 2.6 3.5 4.2
Mexico 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.1 2.6 3.3 2.8 3.2 2.5
Peru 0.1 -0.0002 0.3 1.6 6.1 3.4 5.3 3.1 3.1
Venezuela 0.9 3.6 1.0 0.6 1.4 1.3 3.1 6.3 4.7
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues; and Central Bank of Bolivia, External Sector Bulletin, various issues.  
 
3.  Composition of Foreign Direct Investment 
3.1.  Sectoral Location 
Data on the sectoral location of FDI in Bolivia are available from 1990 forward.  The principal recipients of 
FDI have been the business and services sector (service sector), and the hydrocarbons sector, both of which have 
benefited greatly from capitalization inflows. 
 
The gas pipeline to Brazil and increasing levels of hydrocarbon exploration and production will play vital roles 
in Bolivia’s ability to maintain stable levels of FDI well into the twenty-first century.  The hydrocarbon sector has 
been the primary destination of FDI since the Central Bank of Bolivia began recording FDI inflows in 1990, 
receiving 52 percent of all FDI flows over the 1990-98 period. The sharp increase in FDI inflows to the 
hydrocarbon sector has been sparked by the adoption of the Hydrocarbons Law on 30 April 1996, the capitalization 
of YPFB, and the construction of a pipeline to Brazil giving producers efficient access to the Brazilian market.  It is 
forecast that natural gas exports will increase from 1.6bn cubic feet per year in 1997 to 5.2bn in 2001 as the $1.8 
billion pipeline between Bolivia and southern Brazil reaches full capacity, making the hydrocarbon industry 
Bolivia’s leading export earner. In 1997 the government auctioned off twenty oil exploration contracts for a total of 
$449.4 million over a period of three years for the right to oil and gas production.  These auctions and recent 
discoveries should help insure that Bolivia is able to utilize the gas pipeline at full potential while encouraging 
continued FDI in order to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the gas pipeline and maintain adequate 
identified reserves. 
 
In 1998, the hydrocarbon sector received 59.8 percent of all FDI inflows, due in part to an additional $97.6 
million invested in the oil pipeline linking Bolivia with Brazil (Table 5).  In 1999 the hydrocarbon sector is 
expected to receive 69.5 percent of total FDI inflows, more than quadrupling the amount received by the electricity 
sector, the second leading recipient of FDI.  Further estimates indicate that the hydrocarbon sector will receive 73.2   -10-  
percent of all non-capitalization flows in 1999, making this sector a crucial ingredient in the maintenance of stable 
FDI flows, especially when capitalization flows to all sectors dry up in 2004.  
 
Table 5.  Foreign Direct Investment in Bolivia by Sector, 1990-99 (In millions of U.S. dollars)
Business and Services Electricity Hydrocarbons Industry Mining Totals Annual Total
Private Capitalization Private Capitalization Private Capitalization Pipeline Private Private Private Capitalization Pipeline
1990 9.9                       -    -                       -    50.8                       -                     -    0.7 5.7 67.0                       -                    -                     67.0 
1991 12.5                       -    -                       -    75.1                       -                     -    2.0 6.1 95.7                       -                    -                     95.7 
1992 28.4                       -    -                       -    83.0                       -                     -    2.0 8.7 122.1                       -                    -                   122.1 
1993 3.0                       -    -                       -    65.6                       -                     -    14.5 40.5 123.6                       -                    -                   123.6 
1994 20.5                       -    -                       -    62.6                       -                     -    18.7 28.6 130.2                       -                    -                   130.2 
1995 92.6 55.4 -                       -    124.8                       -                     -    53.5 47.9 318.9                   55.4                   -                   374.3 
     1st Quarter 6.1                       -    -                       -    17.5                       -                     -    6.2 14.8 44.6                       -                    -                     44.6 
     2nd Quarter 29.0                       -    -                       -    20.6                       -                     -    45.4 6.9 101.9                       -                    -                   101.9 
     3rd Quarter 0.4                   50.3  -                       -    30.9                       -                     -    1.7 16.4 49.4                   50.3                   -                     99.7 
     4th Quarter 57.1                     5.1  -                       -    55.8                       -                     -    0.1 9.8 122.8                     5.1                   -                   127.9 
1996 56.6                 143.8  -                       -    118.0                       -                     -    100.2 55.5 330.3                 143.8                   -                   474.1 
     1st Quarter 0.9                   26.9  -                       -    31.0                       -                     -    20.6 19.3 71.8                   26.9                   -                     98.7 
     2nd Quarter 33.6                   24.9  -                       -    31.0                       -                     -    55.2 10.6 130.4                   24.9                   -                   155.3 
     3rd Quarter 7.7                   46.5  -                       -    32.3                       -                     -    16.5 16.5 73.0                   46.5                   -                   119.5 
     4th Quarter 14.4                   45.5  -                       -    23.7                       -                     -    7.9 9.1 55.1                   45.5                   -                   100.6 
1997 (p) 52.7 124.1 7.5                   29.9  170.5                 152.7             129.1  19.4 44.6 294.7                 306.7             129.1                 730.5 
     1st Quarter 12.0                   47.4  2.0                   12.3  26.0                   60.0                   -    2.2 6.3 48.5                 119.7                   -                   168.2 
     2nd Quarter 16.5                   29.8  2.0                     7.2  29.4                   35.5               36.3  5.5 14.1 67.5                   72.5               36.3                 176.3 
     3rd Quarter 9.2                   26.1  2.0                     6.3  46.7                   34.0               20.7  5.0 19.2 82.1                   66.4               20.7                 169.2 
     4th Quarter 14.9                   20.8  1.5                     4.2  68.4                   23.2               72.1  6.7 4.9 96.4                   48.2               72.1                 216.7 
1998 (p) 91.0                 130.1  22.8                   53.0  126.3 297.3              97.6  15.8 38.2 294.0                 480.4               97.6                 872.0 
     1st Quarter 13.3                   35.4  2.1                     7.7  28.1                   59.9               29.5  5.9 10.5 60.0                 103.0               29.5                 192.4 
     2nd Quarter 12.8                   27.9  5.6                   11.3  44.1                   75.3               13.5  1.1 20.4 84.0                 114.5               13.5                 212.0 
     3rd Quarter 49.1                   35.9  9.6                   20.0  37.9                   86.8               29.6  8.8 2.7 108.1                 142.7               29.6                 280.4 
     4th Quarter 15.9                   30.9  5.4                   14.1  16.2                   75.3               25.1  0.1 4.5 42.1                 120.3               25.1                 187.4 
1999 (e) 15.2                   53.9  28.1                   85.3  226.5                 278.3               16.2  22.0 23.4 315.0                 418.0               16.2                 749.1 
     1st Quarter 6.7                   15.1  12.7                   27.3  79.8                   55.8               16.2  2.4 6.0 107.6                   98.2               16.2                 222.0 
     2nd Quarter 2.7                   11.5  3.1                   14.9  60.3                   74.8                   -    11.2 8.5 85.8                 101.2                   -                   187.0 
     3rd Quarter 2.8                   12.7  4.6                   20.0  41.3                   69.7                   -    4.0 4.3 57.0                 102.4                   -                   159.4 
     4th Quarter 3.1                   14.6  7.7                   23.2  45.2                   78.1                   -    4.4 4.7 65.1                 115.9                   -                   181.0 
Total 382.4 507.3 58.4 168.2 1,103.2 728.3 242.9 248.8 299.2 2,092.0 1,404.3 242.9             3,739.2 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.
Notes: (p) preliminary, (e) estimate.  Due to rounding sectoral components of FDI may not add up to the total shown.  
 
Outside the hydrocarbon sector the main destination of FDI has been the service sector.  Since 1995 this sector 
has benefited from a huge influx of FDI following the capitalization of the state telephone company ENTEL (Tables 
3 and 5).  Prior to the commencement of capitalization inflows FDI in the service sector represented only 16 percent 
of all FDI flows over the 1990:1-1995:2 period.  However, by 1996 FDI in the service sector had climbed to 42.3 
percent of total FDI inflows.  This acceleration resulted primarily from capitalization inflows to ENTEL (as well as 
LAB and the railway sector), which by themselves represented 30.3 percent of all FDI inflows in 1996.  In spite of 
its recent strong performance FDI in the service sector is expected to decline from a high of $200.4 million in 1996 
to $69.2 million in 1999 as both private and capitalization flows shrink in size.  
 
The service sector, most notably telecommunications and transportation, could potentially prove very attractive 
to foreign investors if Bolivia were to take advantage of its geographical location to evolve into a 
telecommunications and transportation hub for South America.  However, in the near term, the monopolies present 
in ENTEL and ENFE, as well as Bolivia’s poor transportation infrastructure, will restrict the potential contribution 
of the service sector to the growth and stability of FDI inflows.  Continued public investment in transportation 
infrastructure and the opening of the telecommunications market in September 2001 should enhance both FDI and 
competition in this sector in the long-term. 
 
Direct investment in the mining sector has steadily declined in recent years.  The increasingly low levels are the 
result of (1) the Bre-X Minerals gold scandal in Indonesia in early 1997 which has significantly reduced worldwide   -11-  
investment in mineral exploration; (2) slumping international mineral prices, most notably for gold, which reached a 
twenty year low in 1999; (3) regular changes in the rules of the game governing investment; (4) the insecure nature 
of contracts given the poor state of the judicial system; (5) indirect taxes equal to 22.45 percent levied on capital 
goods imports destined for mineral exploration and production; and (6) continuing conflicts with Chile over the 
transportation of minerals to Chilean ports.   
 
A recent report by the Ministry of International Trade and Investment (1998) highlights the impact of the 
above-mentioned measures.  It estimates that there were 87 foreign owned mining companies operating in Bolivia 
who received foreign investment during the 1992-97 period.  However, in spite of these seemingly positive 
numbers, only 4 of the 87 companies actually made investments in 1997 while the majority of the remaining 
companies have pulled their operations out of Bolivia.  The effects of this cycle of (1) initial investment; (2) foreign 
and particularly domestic obstacles to continued investment; and (3) the eventual closure of operations are 
illustrated in Table 5.  From a high of $55.5 million in 1996, FDI has shrunk to $38.1 million in 1998, and estimates 
indicate that these levels could drop still further to $23.5 million by 1999. 
5 
 
Direct investment flows into the electricity sector were only just beginning in 1997 and are expected to be 
strengthened in coming years by capitalization inflows and the recent purchases by foreign companies of four 
companies in this sector.  These flows should continue to steadily increase, eclipsing flows to the service sector by 
1999, due to increasing levels of FDI in the Bolivian Power Company (COBEE), the La Paz Electricity Company 
(ELECTROPAZ), the Cochabamba Light and Electricity Company (ELFEC), and the transportation unit of ENDE 
(ETE), which are all foreign owned, in addition to continued capitalization commitments.
6 
 
In the industrial sector FDI peaked in 1996 at $100.2 million, declining to $15.9 million by 1998.  Like the 
mining sector no capitalized companies are represented in this sector.  Thus, FDI in the industrial sector will be 
driven solely by non-capitalization flows in the coming years.  The leading investors are expected to be 
Sudamericana de Seda of the United States, Grupo Gloria of Peru through its investments in the La Paz and 
Cochabamba PIL plants, and C.D.C. of Britain.
7   
 
3.2.  Country of Origin 
Data on FDI inflows by country of origin are available from the Central Bank beginning in 1990.
8  As Table 6 
illustrates the principal sources of these FDI flows have been the United States, Latin America, and increasingly 
Europe.  
 
                                                           
5 In spite of the recent decline in mining investment, FDI in this sector is projected to increase sharply in the coming years as 
development of the San Cristóbal mine comes online.  The Andean Silver Corporation is expected to invest hundreds of millions 
of dollars to develop San Cristóbal, one of the world’s largest open pit silver and zinc deposits. 
6 ETE was sold to the Spanish consortium Unión Fenosa for $39.9 million; NRG Energy of the United States and Vittenfall of 
Sweden purchased 95 percent of the shares in COBEE for $171.6 million; ELFEC was sold to EMEL of Chile for $50.3 million; 
and ELECTROPAZ was purchased by Iberdrola of Spain for $65.3 million. 
7 Ministry of International Trade and Investment (September 1998, Table 5).   -12-  
Table 6.  Foreign Direct Investment in Bolivia by Country of Origin, 1990-98 (In millions of U.S. dollars)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 (p)
North America/Caribbean            41.96             70.29          108.08           71.32           77.67         134.57         166.97          284.55  306.90
     Canada - - - - - -          36.17              4.00  4.28
     M e x i c o -------- 0 . 0 9
     United States            41.96             70.29          108.08           71.32           77.67         134.57         130.80          280.55  302.53
South/Central America            17.62             12.12              7.16           35.30           32.76         218.32         163.51          161.75  284.97
     Argentina            14.32             11.82              4.51             9.60             6.76           10.37           30.00          124.67  207.36
     Brazil              1.67               0.25              1.62             7.34             6.00           32.78           70.60              4.69  34.50
     Chile - - -            0.07             2.00         174.15           46.90              8.52  23.01
     Colombia - - -          14.13           11.00             0.72             0.01            15.72  0.28
     C o s t a  R i c a -------- 2 . 8 9
     Panama - - - - - - -             1.56  12.28
     Paraguay - - - - - - -             0.04  0.10
     Peru              1.63               0.06  -            2.16             2.00             0.31           16.00              6.55  4.53
     Uruguay -------- 0 . 0 2
     V e n e z u e l a --             1 . 0 2              2 . 0 0              5 . 0 0   ----
Europe              5.94             11.02              5.10           12.95           15.00           19.35         120.62          271.97  244.64
     A u s t r i a -------- 0 . 5 2
     Belgium/Luxembourg - - - - - - -             4.72  8.01
     England - - - - -            2.65             0.30            38.07  14.70
     France - - - - - -            4.20              2.20  11.78
     Germany              5.94             11.02              5.07           12.95           15.00             4.70             5.90  - -
     Ireland - - - - - - - -            0.04 
     Italy - - - - - -          80.00          148.12         109.65 
     Netherlands - - - - -            1.12             0.12              1.31  44.13
     Spain - - - - -            9.90           30.10            76.78  42.79
     Sweden - - - - - - -             0.51  9.67
     Switzerland - -             0.03  - -            0.99  -             0.26  3.36
Asia              0.34               0.42              0.36             2.00             2.56             0.05             0.40              2.45  8.40
     Japan              0.34               0.42              0.36             2.00             2.56             0.05             0.40              0.25  0.61
     N o r t h  K o r e a -------- 0 . 7 9
     South Korea - - - - - - -             2.20  7.00
Others              1.10               1.88              1.46             2.03             2.23             2.00           22.64              9.78  27.08
     Australia - - - - - -          13.10  - 1.51
     Barbados - - - - - - - - 1.97
     Caiman Islands - - - - - -            0.50              1.50  18.64
     New Zealand - - - - - - -             4.64  -
     Virgin Islands (Britain) - - - - - - -             0.48             4.54 
     Virgin Islands (U.S.) - - - - - - -             3.17             0.41 
     Others              1.10               1.88              1.46  2.03                       2.23  2.00                       9.04  - -
Total            66.96             95.73          122.15         123.60         130.23         374.30         474.14          730.50         871.99 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.
Note: (p) preliminary  
 
In 1990 United States FDI in Bolivia represented roughly 62.7 percent of all FDI.  According to a recent FDI 
survey (discussed in Section 4) the United States was the leading investor in the hydrocarbon, mining, industrial, 
and electricity sectors in 1998, with the only exception being the service sector, where capitalization flows from 
STET International of Italy to ENTEL eclipsed those from the United States.  Although United States FDI has 
increased more than seven times over between 1990 and 1998, its share in total FDI slipped to 34.7 percent in 1998.  
This reduction in percent share has resulted from an increase in Latin American and European investment, sparked 
by the capitalization process.  
 
Since 1990 FDI from Latin America has represented 31.2 percent of total annual FDI flows, while the strongest 
and most consistent investors have been the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, as well as the 
countries comprising the Andean Community (Table 6).
9  Prior to capitalization the majority of Argentine 
investment was represented in the hydrocarbon sector, while Brazilian companies focused on mining and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 The data likely fail to include a number of foreign investors prior to 1998. 
9 The Andean Community is comprised of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.    -13-  
commercial agriculture (especially the soybean industry).  The large increase in FDI in 1995 resulted from $174.2 
million in Chilean investments primarily in banking, soft drinks, and other business activities.  These flows alone 
represented 79.8 percent of all Latin American investment and 46.5 percent of total investment in 1995.   
Meanwhile, flows from Latin America since 1996 have been motivated by YPF and Pérez Companc of Argentina, 
Cruz Blanca of Chile, and VASP of Brazil, who began to meet their capitalization investment requirements in the 
hydrocarbon, railway, and airline industries, respectively (Table 3).  
 
Until capitalization inflows began in 1995 the role of FDI from outside the Americas was very small.  Of the 
twenty countries outside this region which invested between 1990 and 1998, only six made investments between 
1990 and 1995, and these investments only amounted to 10.4 percent of total investment over the period.  Although 
investment from outside the Americas has increased substantially since 1996, to an average of 34.1 percent of total 
FDI over the period 1996-98, this increase has been driven almost entirely by unsustainable capitalization inflows.  
Since 1995 the Netherlands, England, Spain, and Italy have all played increasingly important roles through their 
investments in a number of capitalized companies (Table 3), while France has invested in the hydrocarbon and 
water systems industries and Germany has invested in the industrial sector.
10  Additionally, Australian companies 
have invested primarily in the mining industry, and when combined with American and Canadian interests the 
investments of these three countries alone represent nearly all investment in the mining sector.  
 
Direct Investment from Asia has been the weakest performer with respect to regional investment with the only 
investors being Japan, and North and South Korea.  The low levels of Asian investment are driven in part by (1) the 
minimal strategic significance of Bolivia for many Asian companies, especially outside of natural resources; (2) the 
lack of participation by Asian companies in the capitalization process; and (3) the lack of concessionary terms many 
Asian companies have been offered in other parts of the world.  
 
4.  Data 
All regression data are quarterly and cover the period 1990-1998.  The biggest constraint to carrying out a study 
on FDI in Bolivia is the availability and quality of data on a quarterly basis, especially in the case of FDI.  Until 
1998 there were few mechanisms in place to measure inflows of FDI and the Investment Law adopted on 17 
September 1990 does not require that foreign investors or the recipient companies declare FDI inflows.  In mid-
1998 the Ministry of International Trade and Investment, the Central Bank of Bolivia, the National Institute of 
Statistics (INE), and the Bolivian Private Business Confederation (CEPB) created a quarterly survey which was 
distributed to companies believed to be receiving foreign investment inflows.
11  Although this survey represents a 
positive step, the fact that non-capitalized companies are under no legal obligation to declare their investment 
                                                           
10 In June of 1997 Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux of France and Soc. Com. de la Plata and Meller y Arousa of Argentina were 
awarded the 30-year concession to operate Aguas del Illimani which is in charge of the distribution of water in La Paz and El 
Alto.  It has been estimated that these two companies will invest roughly $362 million in their operations over the 30-year 
period.  See Ministry of International Trade and Investment (March 1998, pp. 24-5). 
11 According to the Ministry of International Trade and Investment 331 companies were estimated to have been recipients of FDI 
between 1992 and 1997.  Of these 331, there were 23 located in the hydrocarbon sector, 87 in the mining sector, 61 in the 
industrial sector, and 160 in the service sector.  See Ministry of International Trade and Investment (March 1998, Annex A).   -14-  




The lack of consistent and reliable FDI data is highlighted by the fact that the Central Bank, Ministry of 
International Trade and Investment, IMF, and World Bank regularly have conflicting FDI figures (Table 7).  We 
have elected to utilize two sources for data on foreign direct investment.  The regressions rely upon the Central 
Bank’s figures from 1995 forward and those from the IMF for the earlier periods, as the Central Bank only began to 
compile quarterly data in 1995.  In the remainder of the paper all statistics, figures, and tables refer to annual FDI 
data compiled by the Central Bank. 
 
Table 7.  Comparison of Sources for Foreign Direct Investment, 1990-98
(In millons of U.S. dollars)
Central Bank of                
Bolivia
Ministry of International 
Trade and Investment IMF World Bank
1990 67.0 - 27.2 28.1
1991 95.7 - 52.0 54.0
1992 122.1 169.0 93.1 95.0
1993 123.6 128.8 123.8 147.0
1994 130.2 173.9 130.2 147.2
1995 374.3 335.4 392.7 376.0
1996 474.1 424.5 474.1 476.1
1997 730.5 635.7 730.7 603.5
1998 872.0 872.0 872.4 …
Sources: External Sector Bulletin, various issues (Central Bank of Bolivia), Inversión en Bolivia: 1992-1998 (Ministry of International Trade
and Investment), IMF, International Financial Statistics CD ROM August 1999 (IMF), and Global Development Finance: Country Tables
(World Bank).  
 
Unless otherwise noted, all data on FDI refer to gross inflows.  We elected to use gross data instead of net data 
because (1) we are interested in measuring the effects of FDI on the host country; and (2) outflows of FDI are 
insignificant in the period covered by our model.  Due to the almost negligible effect of FDI prior to 1990, and the 
poor quality of the available data, we elected to avoid earlier periods in our model. Finally, interpretation of all FDI 
figures should be approached with caution.  FDI figures from the early 1990s to the present are regularly updated, 
while the FDI inflows presented in Table 2 are prone to error given the inadequacy of the mechanisms used to 
measure FDI in the past. 
 
5.  Primary Determinates of Foreign Direct Investment 
5.1.  Model Specification 
In recent years there has been very little empirical work studying the determinants of FDI in developing 
countries.  Jun and Singh (1995) pool a group of data for 31 countries between 1970-93 and find that in the low FDI 
group in which Bolivia is placed the chief determinants of FDI are socioeconomic stability (measured as lost work 
days) and political risk.  Meanwhile, a recent study by CEPAL (1998) examined the impact of a number of variables 
                                                           
12 For a more detailed analysis of the statistical challenges and complications presented by FDI, refer to CEPAL (1998).   -15-  
on FDI in Bolivia over the 1972-95 period.  Only the ratio of international reserves to external debt proved to be 
significant, while pooled data for a large sample of Latin American countries highlighted real GDP, FDI stock, trade 
liberalization, and inflation as important determinants of FDI. 
 
In our model inflation was chosen to gauge macroeconomic stability.  The ability to control inflation should 
reduce investment risks and enhance FDI.  Another important indicator of economic stability is the ratio of external 
debt to GDP which, in similar fashion to the ratio of international reserves to external debt utilized by CEPAL, 
provides a strong indicator of a country’s level of solvency.  Other important indicators are the real effective 
multilateral exchange rate which measures the profitability of the tradable-goods sector and the value of repatriated 
profits, and the ratio of government consumption to GDP, which provides a good measure of a government’s degree 
of involvement in the public sector.  Intuitively, one would expect a reduction in government consumption, through 
privatization or other means, to stimulate FDI.  Finally, the capitalization dummy was chosen to capture the impact 
of the capitalization process on FDI inflows. 
 
To measure the primary determinants of FDI in Bolivia the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
has been constructed using quarterly data for the period 1990:1-1998:4.  The equation is a semi-logarithmic function 
given by: 
 
FDI/GDP t = α1 + α2REER t + α3DEBT/GDP t + α4DCAP t + α5(log)GOVSPENDING/GDP t +                  (1)   
 α6π  t-1  + u t              
 
where FDI/GDP represents the ratio of real FDI to real GDP, REER is the real effective multilateral exchange rate, 
DEBT/GDP is the ratio of real external debt to real GDP, the log of GOVSPENDING/GDP is the ratio of real 
government spending to real GDP, and DCAP is a dummy variable designed to measure the effect of capitalization 
inflows on FDI.  It takes a value of one for the period 1995:3-1998:4, and a value zero for the remaining periods in 
the model.  Lastly, π is inflation lagged one period and u is a random error.  The data are described in the Appendix 
and the regression results are presented in Table 8. 
   -16-  






Real effective multilateral exchange rate 0.0495* 0.0520* 0.0823***
(1.9790) (1.6742) (2.9202)
External debt/GDP -0.1904*** -0.1868*** -0.1190***
(-3.3191) (-3.0828) (-2.9308)
Capitalization dummy 3.4253*** 3.4348*** -
(4.5549) (4.2855) -
Log (Government spending/GDP) - -0.1515 1.3255
- (-0.0983) (0.5012)
Inflation (lag 1) - -0.0674 0.0674
- (-0.6967) (0.6969)
Constant 10.0452* 10.1227 -2.6528
(1.8717) (1.4340) (-0.2775)
R
2 0.8733 0.8710 0.5391
R
2-Adjusted 0.8614 0.8488 0.4776
Durbin-Watson 2.3075 2.2953 2.0594
Number of Observations 36 35 35
Test for Unit Root in Residuals
c
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller -3.4350 -3.30217 -3.4277
     MacKinnon Critical Value (1%) -2.6321 -2.63440 -2.6344
     Phillips-Perron -6.8767 -6.80667 -6.1646
     MacKinnon Critical Value (1%) -2.6300 -2.63210 -2.6321
Johansen Cointegration Test
d
Number of Cointegrating Equations Likelihood Ratio
     None 48.2471* 130.8312** 123.7988**
     At most 1 21.0407 68.1306* 65.2783*
     At most 2 35.5081 36.5269
aPlease see Appendix 1 for definitions and sources of variables.
bEquation estimated excluding capitalization inflows from the FDI variable.
cResidual series tested with one lag, excluding trend and intercept terms.
d*(**) indicates rejection of no cointegration hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level.
Notes: t-statistics given in parentheses. Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance at the *10 percent, **5 percent, and ***1






5.2.  Estimation Results 
With the exception of the ratio of government spending to GDP and inflation in Regression 3, all the variables 
in Table 8 exhibit their expected sign.  The coefficients for the real effective multilateral exchange rate, the ratio of 
external debt to GDP, and the capitalization process are significant across specifications.  The coefficients for 
government spending and the inflation rate are found to be insignificant in both Regressions 2 and 3.   
 
The results for real effective multilateral exchange rate indicate that an increase in the real effective multilateral 
exchange rate (which represents a depreciation of the Boliviano) would lead to an increase in FDI.  This result is   -17-  
consistent with those obtained in other studies.  In one study by Goldberg and Klein (1997) a real depreciation of 
Southeast Asian currencies against the yen was shown to increase FDI flows from Japan to Southeast Asia.   
Possibly the most important channel through which a depreciation of the real exchange rate encourages FDI inflows 
in a developing country such as Bolivia is through its reduction of domestic labor costs relative to foreign 
production costs.  In this context, a depreciation of the Boliviano would increase the demand for labor and 
employment, thus raising the return on capital and increasing FDI.
13 
 
Given the robustness of the capitalization dummy in the first two regressions the general equation was re-
estimated excluding capitalization inflows from the FDI variable.  This specification allows us to measure the 
impact of the remaining variables in a more representative environment in which the better part of FDI inflows are 
not determined by capitalization commitments.  The exclusion of capitalization inflows in Regression 3 of Table 8 
has a minimal impact on the overall results.  Both government spending and the inflation rate remain insignificant 
(while taking on the incorrect sign), the statistical significance of the real effective multilateral exchange rate 
improves from 1 percent to 10 percent, and the explanatory power of the ratio of external debt to GDP remains high. 
 
6.  Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth 
6.1.  Model Specification 
The empirical growth literature has identified a number of variables that are typically correlated with economic 
growth.
14  Among the available variables we have chosen to use is the ratio of government consumption to GDP, 
which has been used in previous growth studies to measure the extent of fiscal adjustment.  The basic argument is 
that a reduction in government consumption reduces the level of distortionary taxation and may also help to reduce 
a crowding-out of private sector investment, measures which positively impact economic growth.  Other variables 
we have chosen include the terms-of-trade, which provides a good measure of the economic impact of variations in 
import and export prices, and inflation, which has proven to be a good indicator of macroeconomic stability.  In 
recent years a number of empirical studies have suggested that inflation may have adverse effects on economic 
growth.
15  While a recent study by Bruno and Easterly (1998) found that inflation had little relation to growth at 
annual rates below 40 percent, Barro (1996), in a cross-country regression of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1990, 
found that an average annual inflation rate of 10 percent reduces real per capita GDP growth by 0.3-0.4 percentage 
points per year.  We also include the ratio of private sector credit relative to GDP.  King and Levine (1993) find a 
strong positive relationship between this ratio and per capita GDP growth. Lastly, the ratio of FDI to GDP and a 
dummy for the capitalization period are incorporated into the model to see if FDI, and more recently the large 
capitalization inflows, have significantly impacted economic growth.
16  
                                                           
13 It should be noted that Bolivia has experienced an appreciation of its real effective multilateral exchange rate in recent years.  
To test whether FDI has played a role in the appreciation Granger causality tests (not presented) with lag intervals from 1 to 3 
were estimated for 1990:1-1998:4 and 1995:3-1998:4.  The results indicate causality from the real effective multilateral 
exchange rate to FDI, but reject the possibility of reverse causality. 
14 See, for instance, De Gregorio (1992), Barro (1996), Easterly et al. (1997), Borensztein et al. (1998), and IMF Staff Country 
Report (1998). 
15 See, for example, Bruno and Easterly (1998), and Barro (1996). 
16 An education variable was not included in the equation.  Data limitations and the fact that education levels change slowly over 
time make it difficult for our short-term specification to capture the effect of education on per capita GDP growth.    -18-  
 
In order to measure the effect of FDI on economic growth we will use OLS estimation controlling for serial 
correlation for the following semi-logarithmic model which covers the period 1990:1-1998:4 using quarterly data: 
 
GROWTH t = α1 + α2FDI/GDP t-1 + α3DCAP t  + α4TOT t + α5CREDIT/GDP t +                                         (2) 
 α6(log)GOVSPENDING/GDP t + α7π t-1 + u t  
 
where GROWTH represents the percent variation in real per capita GDP over each period, FDI/GDP is the ratio of 
real FDI to real GDP, DCAP is a dummy variable representing capitalization inflows during the period 1995:3-
1998:4, TOT represents the ratio of export prices to import prices (terms-of-trade), CREDIT/GDP is the ratio of real 
private domestic credit to real GDP, GOVSPENDING/GDP is the ratio of real government spending to real GDP, π 
measures the quarterly percent change in the Bolivian consumer price index lagged one period, and u is a random 
error.  The variables are described in the Appendix and the results are presented in Table 9.   -19-  
Table 9.  The Effect of Foreign Direct Investment on Real Per Capita GDP Growth, 1990:1-1998:4




FDI/GDP (lag 1) 0.0275* -
(1.7581) -




Private sector credit/GDP 0.0611** 0.0656**
(2.0206) (2.1564)
Log (Government spending/GDP) -0.7931* -0.7512*
(-1.8063) (-1.7491)
Inflation rate (lag 1) -0.0095 -0.0082
(-0.2856) (-0.2541)








Number of Observations 34 34
Test for Unit Root in Residuals
b
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller -4.5446 -4.5281
     MacKinnon Critical Value (1%) -2.6369 -2.6369
     Phillips-Perron -4.7556 -4.7020
     MacKinnon Critical Value (1%) -2.6344 -2.6344
Johansen Cointegration Test
c
Number of Cointegrating Equations Likelihood Ratio
     None 185.2735** 149.2005**
     At most 1 111.2997** 82.5057**
     At most 2 61.2538 44.0169*
     At most 3 19.5695
aPlease see Appendix 1 for definitions and sources of variables.
bResidual series tested with one lag, excluding trend and intercept terms.
c*(**) indicates rejection of no cointegration hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level.






6.2. Estimation  Results 
All variables take on their expected sign.  Our results indicate that FDI has had a statistically significant (10 
percent level) impact on per capita GDP growth while capitalization inflows have had an insignificant impact. 
Substituting the capitalization dummy variable for FDI in Regression 2 of Table 9 has very little impact on the   -20-  
overall results.
17  Although many expected capitalization inflows to produce higher levels of growth, Figure 2 
reveals that real per capita GDP growth has been largely stagnate in recent years, while the level of real per capita 
GDP growth attained in 1998 was below levels achieved in 1990 and 1991.  The low level of significance of the 
FDI to GDP ratio and the insignificance of capitalization inflows reflect the importance of time.  The time period 
covered in our model is relatively short while the impact of FDI on growth is not immediate.  Technology must be 
adopted and diffused, and management and production techniques must be enhanced, processes that are only just 
beginning to take shape in Bolivia.
18    
 






























































Real GDP Growth Real GDP Growth Per Capita Foreign Direct Investment
Sources: Central Bank of Bolivia, External Sector Bulletin, various issues; and the National Institute of Statistics.
 
 
The results for the terms-of-trade specification are robust across both specifications, emphasizing the 
importance of variations in export and import prices on per capita GDP growth.  These variations are an important 
source of economic instability in less-developed countries such as Bolivia where the majority of export earnings are 
                                                           
17 As noted in Section 4, quarterly FDI figures from the IMF were utilized in our models prior to 1995.  As Table 7 shows IMF 
data for 1990-1992 underestimate figures supplied by the Central Bank of Bolivia, a situation that may produce an 
underestimation of the FDI coefficient reported in Regression 1 of Table 9. 
18 Taking this into account Equation 1 of Table 9 was re-estimated with FDI lagged from 2 to 10 periods, as well as without a 
lag.  With the exception of FDI lagged one period, all remaining lag lengths (results not reported) produced statistically 
insignificant results.    -21-  
derived from volatile primary commodities.  The regressions in Table 9 also show a significantly negative effect 
between government spending and per capita GDP growth.  This result emphasizes the importance of credible and 
permanent fiscal adjustment as a key component in per capita GDP growth.  Finally, the ratio of private sector credit 
to GDP is significant in both regressions.  The assumption underlying this measure is that greater allocation of 
credit to the private sector will increase financial depth and development, and subsequently economic growth.  
 
As predicted by theory, inflation has a negative, though insignificant effect on the growth rate of GDP per 
capita in Table 9.  The insignificance of this variable likely results from the relatively low levels of inflation Bolivia 
has experienced in our model specification.  Over the nine year period included in our model inflation averaged 
only 10.3 percent per year, and has dropped sharply in recent years.  Whereas, inflation averaged 504.7 percent 
between 1960-87, and 38.1 percent over this same period if one were to exclude the hyperinflationary period of 
1984-85.  This helps to explain why a recent study by the IMF (IMF Staff Country Report, 1998) using annual data 
for the period 1960-97 found that inflation had a robustly negative effect on per capita GDP growth.    
 
7.  Econometric Specification 
7.1.  Unit Root Tests 
Classic econometrics assumes that models are linear and that the data series in these models are stationary.  
Thus, the first test we carried out was an Augmented Durbin-Watson (ADF) test to determine the order of 
integration of our variables.  The results presented in Table 10 show that both our dependent variables (per capita 
GDP growth, and FDI/GDP) are stationary, or I(0) (the ratio of FDI to GDP is I(1) in the ADF test).  The ratio of 
external debt to GDP, and the ratio of private sector credit to GDP are integrated of order 2 (the Phillips-Perron test 
indicates that the ratio of external debt to GDP is I(1)), and a number of variables in our model are integrated of 
I(1), meaning that they are stationary in their first differences.   
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ADF: Level -1.8105 -2.2133 -3.5035 -12.0554 -4.4160
ADF: 1st Difference -3.1692 -8.2529 -5.9109 - -
A D F :  2 n d  D i f f e r e n c e - 5 . 6 9 6 9 ----
MacKinnon Critical Value (1%)
a -4.2712 -4.2605 -4.2605 -4.2505 -4.2505
MacKinnon Critical Value (5%) -3.5562 -3.5514 -3.5514 -3.5468 -3.5468
Phillips-Perron: Level -1.8963 -4.5842 -6.1240 -5.4647 -4.6659
P h i l l i p s - P e r r o n :  1 s t  D i f f e r e n c e - 5 . 6 5 8 9 ----
P h i l l i p s - P e r r o n :  2 n d  D i f f e r e n c e -----
MacKinnon Critical Value (1%) -4.2505 -4.2412 -4.2412 -4.2412 -4.2412






Real Per Capita 
GDP Growth Terms-of-Trade
ADF: Level -1.4324 -1.8672 -5.1501 -2.7594
ADF: 1st Difference -1.8628 -5.7330 - -5.3414
ADF: 2nd Difference -5.8708 - - -
MacKinnon Critical Value (1%) -4.2712 -4.2605 -4.2505 -4.2605
MacKinnon Critical Value (5%) -3.5562 -3.5514 -3.5468 -3.5514
Phillips-Perron: Level -1.0399 -1.9562 -3.7247 -2.0186
Phillips-Perron: 1st Difference -3.2297 -5.9421 - -6.3729
Phillips-Perron: 2nd Difference -10.1968 - - -
MacKinnon Critical Value (1%) -4.2605 -4.2505 -4.2412 -4.2505
MacKinnon Critical Value (5%) -3.5514 -3.5468 -3.5426 -3.5468
Note: The variables were tested with a trend and intercept term, as well as a lag of one.
aThe MacKinnon critical value noted refers to the value obtained in the ADF test in which the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected.  
 
One variable that exhibits a random walk is the real effective multilateral exchange rate.  Although a strict 
interpretation of this result implies that price levels (or the exchange rate) must eventually fall to zero, restrictions 
imposed by cointegration help to qualify this result.  That is to say, if two variables follow a random walk but are 
cointegrated, then the resulting equilibrium relationship and the restrictions it imposes do not allow the variables to 
diverge greatly from this equilibrium in the long run.  In addition to the evidence presented in this paper, a number 
of other recent papers have shown the presence of unit roots in exchange rates.  In one such study by Lothian and 
Taylor (1996), the authors failed to reject the unit root hypothesis for both the dollar-sterling and franc-sterling real 
exchange rates for the 1946-90 and 1974-90 periods. 
 
7.2.  Cointegration 
The purpose of cointegration is to avoid the problems of spurious correlation, which are common in time series 
data.  The cointegration technique is used to see whether a linear combination of variables of the order “d” 
generates a disturbance term which is integrated of a lower order than the variables being analyzed. If in fact the 
disturbance term is I(0) the variables in the regression are cointegrated and will move in proportion to one another 
over the long run.  
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Despite the fact that a number of variables exhibit non-stationary or random walk stochastic processes, linear 
combinations of these variables in our regressions may in fact be stationary.  In order to investigate whether the 
linear combinations of our variables are stationary we applied both the Johansen and ADF cointegration tests.  The 
advantage of these tests is that if the residuals in our regressions are indeed stationary, we can rule out spurious 
correlation in our regressions and apply traditional regression methodology to our time series data.   
 
Utilizing a Johansen cointegration test with a linear deterministic trend and one lag we examined all the 
regressions in both of our models for cointegration.  Our results presented in Tables 8 and 9 indicate that all of our 
regressions are cointegrated, with at least one cointegrating equation in each of our specifications. 
 
Two alternative and quicker methods to check for cointegration are the ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests.  
The results of these tests for unit roots in the residuals are presented in Tables 8 and 9.  As the tables indicate, the 
ADF values exceed the MacKinnon critical value of 1 percent in all cases, indicating that the regressions are 
cointegrated and non-spurious.  The results achieved in these two tests allow us to avoid using the differenced terms 
of the non-stationary variables in our model, a situation that could produce a loss of valuable long-term information 
in our time series data. 
 
7.3.  Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity 
A common occurrence in time series regressions is that the residuals in these regressions are correlated with 
their own lagged values.  To investigate the possibility of serial correlation in our regressions we utilized the 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test.  The results of our tests (not presented) indicate the presence of first-
order serial correlation in our regressions measuring the effect of FDI on real per capita GDP growth.  Consequently 
we have chosen to add a Markov first-order autoregressive specification to our model.  The AR(1) specification 
allows us to improve both the efficiency and reliability of the coefficients as well as their standard errors.   
 
With respect to heteroskedasticity we ran a White heteroskedasticity test for each regression in Tables 8 and 9.  
Our results (not presented) indicate that all the regressions have consistent standard errors and covariances. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
Historically FDI inflows have largely originated from the United States and been concentrated in the 
hydrocarbon and mining sectors.  Inflows to these and other sectors have until recently been highly volatile and 
relatively small due in large part to persistent political and economic instability.  However, in recent years Bolivia 
has experienced relatively high degrees of political and economic stability, and used this stability to undertake a 
broad set of structural reforms.  These reforms have helped to eliminate many of the distortions present in the 
Bolivian economy, leading to higher and more stable levels of FDI since the early 1990s. 
 
In recent years these FDI inflows have largely been concentrated in the service and hydrocarbon sectors.  These 
two sectors received 80.4 percent of all FDI over the period 1990-98 while benefiting greatly from capitalization   -24-  
inflows.  The electricity sector began to receive FDI in 1997 and these flows are expected to grow in 1999 in 
response to capitalization commitments.  Meanwhile, FDI in the industrial and mining sectors has slumped in recent 
years, and neither sector participated in the capitalization process.   
 
The United States continues to be the principal source of FDI in Bolivia.  Over the 1990-98 period FDI 
originating in the United States represented 40.7 percent of all FDI in Bolivia.  Other important sources of FDI in 
the 1990s have been the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and increasingly Europe due to 
the participation of a number of European companies in the capitalization process.  Argentine, Brazilian, and 
Chilean companies all played important roles in the capitalization process, and FDI originating from these three 
countries represented 89.3 percent of Latin American FDI and 27.9 percent of total FDI in Bolivia over the 1990-98 
period. 
 
Regression results estimated using simple OLS regressions indicate that the driving factors behind FDI inflows 
have been the real effective multilateral exchange rate, the ratio of external debt relative to GDP, and a dummy 
representing the capitalization period.   Excluding the capitalization inflows from our model and re-estimating the 
general equation has little impact on the overall results.  The results indicate that macroeconomic stability, as 
expressed by the real effective multilateral exchange rate, and the ratio of external debt to GDP will prove to be key 
determinants of FDI in the post-capitalization period.  Additionally, reforms must be maintained and deepened.  For 
instance, continued reform of the judicial system should help to insure that private contracts are respected and 
enforced, reducing the uncertainty and contractual complications that helped to produce low levels of FDI in the 
past.   
 
The paper finds that the key factors influencing economic growth in Bolivia are the ratio of FDI to GDP, the 
terms-of-trade, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP, and the ratio of government consumption to GDP.  The 
capitalization dummy variable was shown to have an insignificant impact on per capita GDP growth.  In spite of 
economic and political stability, as well as continued reforms, Bolivia’s growth rate still remains below the levels 
necessary to substantially impact poverty reduction.  Although many believed that the capitalization process and the 
resulting increase in FDI would stimulate growth, the results are less than overwhelming, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
However, these results must be taken in context given the strong and influential impact a number of internal and 
external factors have on per capita GDP growth.  Additionally, the time period considered in the regressions is 
relatively short, especially so for the capitalization dummy.  It is very possible that strong growth effects from 
capitalization inflows will only be felt years from now given the differing paces of technology adoption and 
diffusion in distinct sectors of the Bolivian economy. 
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Appendix.  Definitions and Sources of Data 
 
Capitalization dummy: Takes value of one for the period 1995:3-1998:4, and a value of zero for the remaining 
periods. 
External debt: Medium- and long-term external public debt.  Taken from the Statistical Bulletin, Central Bank of 
Bolivia. 
Foreign direct investment: Gross foreign direct investment.  Data from International Financial Statistics CD ROM 
(August 1999), for 1990:1-1994:4; and Central Bank of Bolivia for 1995.1-1998:4. 
Government spending: Total expenditure of federal government (excluding capital spending).  Data obtained from 
the Ministry of Finance; author’s calculations for the period 1990:1-1993:4. 
Inflation: Quarterly percentage change in the consumer price index.  Measured as the percent change between the 
final-month CPI for that quarter and that for the previous quarter. Obtained from Statistical Bulletin, Central 
Bank of Bolivia. 
Private sector credit: Total domestic credit proportioned to the private sector by commercial and specialized banks.  
Data taken from Statistical Bulletin, Central Bank of Bolivia. 
Real GDP: Obtained from the National Institute of Statistics for 1990:1-1997:4; and the Central Bank of Bolivia for 
1998:1-1998:4. 
Real effective multilateral exchange rate: Index of real exchange rate with principal trade partners.  Countries 
included in index are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Peru, and the United States.  
Taken from the External Sector Bulletin, Central Bank of Bolivia. 
Real GDP per capita: Calculated from the above GDP data and population figures supplied by the National Institute 
of Statistics. 
Terms-of-trade: Ratio of export prices to import prices.  Data obtained from the National Institute of Statistics.   -26-  
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